Long post alert, and I’m also late to the party. Sorry for that, if you came here for a witty one-liner.

It’s after all an interesting article, thanks for making it accessible. Here’s a take that I have to offer. I consider myself a literate layman in terms of international relations and global affairs, just to disclaim that mine isn’t an expert opinion, merely a set of notes of an eager observer.

(i) Firstly, Stubbe refers to the power blocks as „Global West“, „Global East“ and „Global South“.

As a reader, I notice that Stubbe picked up think tank language from unequivocally Western foreign policy institutes that separate China from the Global South or the „developing world“ contexts.

Here’s why it matters: Beijing’s foreign policy officials recently began to refer to China as „natural member of the Global South“, or China being part of the Global South on official occasions. On the same occasions, government officials refer to China as „Developing Country“; note that this latter designation is more pronounced in their respective communication, and „Global South“ used in parentheses.

Here’s my interpretation of this: Stubbe hints at a policy that drives a wedge between the “Developing World“ Bloc, which comprises a historical group of former colonized countries (I exclude Russia for a moment from that context, as is perceived it as historically colonising and imperially-driven European power) that after WWII opposed Western imperialism, by excluding China from it.

This could, in fact, create challenges in regards as to how he and other EU leaders navigate global politics in the near term: It could pose the risk of misreading or misjudging emerging trajectories and newly reinforced  dynamics –  and potentially answering it with the wrong instruments. I think it pays to read and listen to UN addresses of developing countries and their positions on global issues from their point of view to anticipate future alignment correctly.

(ii) Secondly, hidden in the proposition for future reforms of the Western global system, Stubbe suggests making the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO) more inclusive for countries from the “Global South”. Now, these three institutions are not UN institutions, but organizations set up with the mission to instate US Economic Order after WWII, some refer to it as Bretton-Woods System.

That system had, among many other purposes, one critical function: to establish and defend the US Dollar as global reserve currency. Now, the core reason that the very volatile grouping of rivaling nations, like China and India, within the BRICS forum can take place, is because of their motivation to move beyond the USD sooner rather than later.

Although the WTO has been in a deadlock for a while, the IMF and Worldbank still function as powerful levers to enforce United States and European financial interests. One key-institution hasn’t been mentioned to call for reform: the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) – “Central Bank of all Central Banks”. For that matter, the proposed logic does not appear to induce a shift in the power balance of the “North-South” relations.

Reading Stubbes pledge to rebalancing power to make the mentioned institutions more accessible to nations of the Global South appears to me that he follows a line that seeks to preserve Western institutional power anchored around the USD.  In more simple terms: integration of the “Global South” into a western-led institutional order, whose rules they are rather unlikely to rewrite.
I call into question the notion that such reform might ever occur desirable from either side: Rising nationalist sentiments in the West are more likely to blockade any reformist change, even if it is of cosmetic nature. And on parts of the “Global South”, overcoming the Dollar dependency is indeed a strategic goal – least because of values, but because it is the better deal in the long-term.

(iii) Thirdly: Stubbe offers us three scenarios of what the future global order might develop according. This is what I like most about this piece, because it says the quiet things out loud. It provides us with a window into the contentions of the West’s rapidly diminishing political base of liberal world order.

Although this is a purely personal account, I come across some liberal Europeans and Americans who cannot fathom that the world can be a sustainable, prosperous and secure one without the West and its fading liberal, market based world order. I think this is most relevant to us in as Europeans, as it indicates that we are in large parts not capable of ideating scenarios different from the post-WWII architecture, attempting to reset or reform instead of dealing with ultimately changed realities.

We need to think of a Europe that can deal with the world according to its times and circumstances – with all its messy changes –  and also entertain the plausible scenario of the US-Allyship becoming practically defunct within the next few years.

I find Stubbe’s piece rather unsettling, not for what it said, but for what he did not: As a conservative he represents Europe’s most influential political wing, yet it has nothing to offer other than a bit of reform or hopes that after Trump leaves the office that the United States will return to reason. Yet, there is no guarantee for that that even a democratic presidency will reinstate the transatlantic economic and political order despite admonitions of shared values or a common heritage).

That is, for a world that is so radically changing, not enough. And I wonder if such a notion is penetrating established circles. I would have wished to read about a strategy for European sovereignty – economic, military and technological, as outlined in the Draghi paper in 2024 – as a new tenet of Europe’s possible futures being furthered in this distinguished publication. It is, however, not even being mentioned.